Nuestro ámbito de actuación abarca las jurisdicciones ordinarias de las Provincias de Salta y de Jujuy y los Tribunales Federales de todo el país, en todas las instancias, incluida la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación.

A partir de septiembre de 2018, extendemos nuestro ámbito de actuación a la Capital Federal (Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires), con posibilidades de intervenir en asuntos ante la Justicia Nacional y Federal en lo Criminal y en lo Correccional en todas sus instancias.

lunes, 23 de febrero de 2026

El principio de complementariedad y las investigaciones en curso ante la CORTE PENAL INTERNACIONAL

 

El principio de complementariedad y las investigaciones en curso ante la CPI:

Prioridad funcional, coherencia sistémica y límites de la jurisdicción universal

I. Introducción

El principio de complementariedad constituye el eje estructural del sistema instaurado por el Estatuto de Roma. Lejos de establecer primacía formal de la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI), el Estatuto adopta un modelo de subsidiariedad: los Estados conservan la responsabilidad primaria y la Corte interviene únicamente cuando aquellos no estén dispuestos o sean incapaces de investigar o juzgar genuinamente.¹

Sin embargo, surge una cuestión distinta cuando la CPI ha abierto formalmente una investigación y se encuentra ejerciendo activamente su jurisdicción: ¿deben los terceros Estados abstenerse de iniciar o continuar procedimientos basados en jurisdicción universal respecto de la misma situación o conducta?

Este trabajo sostiene que, cuando la CPI ejerce activamente su competencia, la coherencia sistémica y el objeto y fin del Estatuto de Roma favorecen reconocer una prioridad funcional de la Corte frente a procedimientos paralelos basados en jurisdicción universal por parte de terceros Estados.


II. Complementariedad como principio estructural

El artículo 17 del Estatuto de Roma establece los criterios de admisibilidad sobre la base de la falta de disposición o incapacidad estatal.²

La jurisprudencia de las Salas de Cuestiones Preliminares ha precisado que la complementariedad exige un análisis comparativo entre el procedimiento nacional y el caso ante la Corte, debiendo referirse sustancialmente a la misma persona y conducta.³

Como señala Stahn, la complementariedad no es solo un mecanismo procesal, sino un principio estructural de distribución de autoridad.⁴ Kleffner, por su parte, destaca que expresa una preferencia sistémica por la persecución nacional coordinada.⁵


III. Jurisdicción universal y fragmentación

La jurisdicción universal permite a los Estados perseguir determinados crímenes internacionales con independencia de vínculos territoriales o personales.⁶

No obstante, su ejercicio simultáneo con investigaciones activas de la CPI puede generar fragmentación probatoria, decisiones contradictorias y competencia estratégica entre foros.

Ambos advierte que el sistema del Estatuto de Roma presupone coordinación y no competencia entre jurisdicciones.⁷


IV. Prioridad funcional de la Corte

Si bien el Estatuto no establece primacía formal, cuando la CPI ha afirmado admisibilidad y ejerce jurisdicción activa, emerge una prioridad funcional basada en:

  1. Integridad sistémica.

  2. Régimen de cooperación (arts 86–93).⁸

  3. Protección del acusado (art 20).⁹

  4. Interpretación conforme al objeto y fin del tratado.¹⁰

En este contexto, la lógica sistémica favorece la abstención prudente de terceros Estados.


V. Límites

La prioridad funcional no es absoluta. La jurisdicción universal puede justificarse cuando:

(a) La investigación de la CPI deviene inactiva;
(b) Determinadas conductas no son perseguidas por la Corte;
(c) Existen bloqueos estructurales de cooperación.


VI. Conclusión

La complementariedad fue concebida como subsidiariedad. Sin embargo, cuando la CPI ejerce activamente su competencia, la coherencia del sistema internacional favorece reconocer una prioridad funcional frente a procedimientos paralelos basados en jurisdicción universal.

No se trata de primacía jerárquica, sino de una exigencia derivada de la arquitectura del Estatuto de Roma y de la necesidad de evitar fragmentación en la justicia penal internacional.


Notas

  1. Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional (adoptado 17 julio 1998, en vigor 1 julio 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Preámbulo párr 10.

  2. Estatuto de Roma (n 1) art 17.

  3. Fiscal c Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decisión sobre la orden de detención) ICC-01/04-01/06 (10 febrero 2006) párrs 29–37.

  4. Carsten Stahn, A Critical Introduction to International Criminal Law (CUP 2019) 217–224.

  5. Jann K Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (OUP 2008) 102–115.

  6. Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2ª edn, OUP 2015) 187–205.

  7. Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume I (OUP 2013) 88–94.

  8. Estatuto de Roma (n 1) arts 86–93.

  9. Estatuto de Roma (n 1) art 20.

  10. Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados (23 mayo 1969) 1155 UNTS 331, art 31(1).


The Principle of Complementarity and Ongoing ICC Investigations

 

The Principle of Complementarity and Ongoing ICC Investigations:

Functional Priority, Systemic Coherence, and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction

I. Introduction

The principle of complementarity constitutes the structural cornerstone of the system established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Rather than conferring primacy upon the Court, the Statute enshrines a model of subsidiarity: national jurisdictions retain primary responsibility, and the ICC intervenes only when States are unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute.¹

However, a more complex question arises when the ICC has already formally opened an investigation and is actively exercising jurisdiction: to what extent should third States refrain from initiating or continuing proceedings based on universal jurisdiction concerning the same situation or conduct?

This article argues that, once the ICC is actively exercising jurisdiction over a situation, systemic coherence and the object and purpose of the Rome Statute favour recognising a form of functional priority of the Court vis-à-vis parallel third-State universal jurisdiction proceedings. This priority is not hierarchical in a formal sense, but it derives from the need to preserve the integrity, coherence, and effectiveness of international criminal adjudication.


II. Complementarity as a Structural Principle

Article 17 of the Rome Statute establishes admissibility criteria grounded in unwillingness or inability.² Complementarity is therefore both a jurisdictional filter and a normative allocation of responsibility between national and international levels.³

The jurisprudence of the ICC Pre-Trial Chambers has clarified that complementarity operates through a comparative analysis between national proceedings and the case before the Court, requiring that domestic proceedings encompass substantially the same person and conduct.⁴

As Stahn observes, complementarity is not merely a procedural mechanism but a structural principle shaping the distribution of authority in international criminal law.⁵ Similarly, Kleffner emphasises that complementarity reflects a systemic preference for national enforcement, yet within a coordinated framework designed to avoid impunity.⁶

Traditionally, the debate has focused on vertical relationships between the ICC and territorial or national States. Less attention has been paid to horizontal tensions between the ICC and third States invoking universal jurisdiction.


III. Ongoing ICC Investigations and Third-State Universal Jurisdiction

Universal jurisdiction allows States to prosecute certain international crimes irrespective of territorial or nationality links.⁷ While its normative justification lies in combating impunity, its simultaneous exercise alongside ICC proceedings may generate fragmentation.

When the ICC has formally opened an investigation under Article 53 and is actively exercising jurisdiction, the initiation of parallel proceedings by third States concerning the same conduct risks:

  1. Evidentiary fragmentation;

  2. Conflicting judicial assessments;

  3. Strategic forum competition;

  4. Undermining cooperation with the Court.

Ambos notes that the Rome Statute system presupposes coordination rather than competition between jurisdictions.⁸ Although the Statute does not explicitly regulate third-State universal jurisdiction in such contexts, its object and purpose — to establish a permanent international criminal court complementary to national jurisdictions — support an interpretation favouring systemic coherence.⁹


IV. Functional Priority of the ICC

The Rome Statute does not establish formal primacy of the ICC. However, once admissibility has been affirmed and investigations are ongoing, a de facto functional priority emerges.

This functional priority rests on four considerations:

1. Systemic Integrity

Allowing concurrent third-State proceedings may jeopardise the consistency of international criminal adjudication. The ICC was designed as a centralised forum capable of addressing situations comprehensively.¹⁰

2. Cooperation Framework

Part 9 of the Rome Statute establishes a detailed cooperation regime. Parallel proceedings by third States may interfere with evidence collection and witness protection mechanisms coordinated by the Court.¹¹

3. Protection of the Accused

Simultaneous proceedings risk infringing principles related to fairness and legal certainty, including ne bis in idem considerations under Article 20.¹²

4. Object and Purpose of the Statute

Under Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, interpretation must consider object and purpose.¹³ The Rome Statute seeks to end impunity through an integrated system; fragmentation undermines this objective.

Therefore, while universal jurisdiction remains legally permissible, systemic logic favours judicial restraint where the ICC is genuinely and actively exercising jurisdiction.


V. Limits and Exceptions

Functional priority is not absolute. Third-State jurisdiction may remain appropriate where:

(a) The ICC investigation becomes dormant or ineffective;
(b) The Court declines to prosecute particular conduct not encompassed in its case selection;
(c) Cooperation with the ICC is structurally blocked.

In such circumstances, universal jurisdiction may serve as a safety net rather than a competing forum.


VI. Conclusion

Complementarity was conceived as a principle of subsidiarity, not primacy. Yet when the ICC has opened and is actively pursuing an investigation, systemic coherence favours recognising a functional priority of the Court over parallel universal jurisdiction proceedings by third States.

This priority is neither hierarchical nor absolute. It arises from the structural logic of the Rome Statute system, the need to preserve judicial coherence, and the objective of avoiding fragmentation in international criminal adjudication.

Universal jurisdiction remains an essential tool against impunity. However, its exercise should not undermine the coordinated architecture established by the Rome Statute.


Footnotes (OSCOLA)

  1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 (Rome Statute) Preamble para 10.

  2. Rome Statute (n 1) art 17.

  3. Carsten Stahn, A Critical Introduction to International Criminal Law (CUP 2019) 217–224.

  4. Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest) ICC-01/04-01/06 (10 February 2006) paras 29–37.

  5. Stahn (n 3) 223–230.

  6. Jann K Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (OUP 2008) 102–115.

  7. Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2015) 187–205.

  8. Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume I (OUP 2013) 88–94.

  9. Rome Statute (n 1) Preamble para 4.

  10. Stahn (n 3) 229–232.

  11. Rome Statute (n 1) arts 86–93.

  12. Rome Statute (n 1) art 20.

  13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, art 31(1)